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Acceptance, grief and meaning
Prigerson & Maciejewski1 assert that the resolution of grief
coincides with increasing acceptance of loss, mainly cognitive
and emotional acceptance. The role of spiritual acceptance has
not been mentioned directly, although experiences like inner
peace, tranquility and letting go, or regaining what is lost or being
taken away, are more spiritual rather than emotional or
intellectual. Moreover, some of the features which can be
considered spiritual are included as criteria for prolonged grief
disorder,2 such as confusion about one’s identity and feeling that
life is empty and meaningless since the loss. Issues related to
culture and the meaning and value of death3 are relevant to both
grief and acceptance, and I wonder whether these should also be
considered.
Patients diagnosed with terminal cancer often confront
existential issues. Experiences with patients with advanced or
terminal cancers indicate that not only is cognitive and emotional
acceptance essential, but that spiritual aspects are equally
important. Spiritual acceptance of grief will help the grieved to
understand the meaning and purpose of the loss. As Frankl4 states
‘suffering ceases to be a suffering as soon as it finds a meaning’.
Longitudinal studies should clarify not only the way in which grief
resolution relates to acceptance of dying and death, but also
whether grief relates differentially to cognitive, emotional and
spiritual acceptance. Prigerson & Maciejewski1 conclude that
decline in grief-related distress appears to correspond with an
increase in peaceful acceptance of loss, which I feel could be
enhanced by addressing issues related to purpose and meaning
of the loss.
There is some small change besides the two sides of the coin!
1 Prigerson HG, Maciejewski PK. Grief and acceptance as opposite sides of the
same coin: setting a research agenda to study peaceful acceptance of loss.
Br J Psychiatry 2008; 193: 435–7.
2 Prigerson HG, Vanderwerker LC, Maciejewski PK. Prolonged grief disorder:
a case for inclusion in DSM–V. In Handbook of Bereavement Research and
Practice: 21st Century Perspectives (eds M Stroebe, R Hansson, H Schut,
et al): 165–86. American Psychological Association Press, 2008.
3 Byock I. The meaning and value of death. J Palliat Med 2002; 5: 279–88.
4 Frankl VE. Man’s Search for Meaning (4th edn). Washington Square Press,
1985.
Santosh K. Chaturvedi, National Institute of Mental Health & Neurosciences,
Bangalore, India. Email: chatur@nimhans.kar.nic.in
doi: 10.1192/bjp.194.6.561
Authors’ reply: We thank Dr Chaturvedi for highlighting the
potentially important role that spirituality plays in the acceptance
of loss. Recent research attests to the powerful influence of
spirituality and religious beliefs in shaping patients’ cognitive
acceptance of terminal illness, treatment preferences, and even
in determining the receipt of intensive, life-prolonging care in
the last week of life.1
Nevertheless, we wish to differentiate between components of
grief (e.g. yearning) and factors affecting the intensity and course
of grief (e.g. spirituality). We posit that grief is on the same
continuum as emotional acceptance – opposite poles of a unitary
dimension. We contend that both spirituality and cognitive
acceptance are distinct from, but related to, emotional acceptance
and grief. Spirituality might foster emotional acceptance; cognitive
acceptance might exacerbate grief. Identifying factors affecting
grief and emotional acceptance may suggest ways to enhance an
individual’s mental health and well-being in the face of death,
and offer ways to minimise loss-related suffering.
As a further distinction, we consider the loss of meaning in the
context of prolonged grief disorder2 to represent the emptiness
experienced by the absence of an attachment figure. It is not
intended to refer to a broader existential crisis. The sense of
emptiness felt in grief may well lead a person to question the
meaning of life. It may heighten an individual’s sense of anomie
(i.e. a feeling of disorientation and alienation from society caused
by the perceived absence of a supporting social or moral frame-
work) and affect a person’s will to live. The meaning derived from
spiritual beliefs may buffer individuals from the emptiness that
follows a major interpersonal loss. Still, we do not consider
spiritual beliefs to be components of grief. Rather spirituality
may be a powerful antidote (perhaps, social support and social
integration are others) to the pain of grief and elixir promoting
emotional acceptance.
1 Phelps AC, Maciejewski PK, Nilsson M, Balboni TA, Wright AA, Paulk ME, et al.
Coping with cancer: religious coping predicts use of intensive life-prolonging
care near death. JAMA 2009; 301: 1140–7.
2 Prigerson HG, Vanderwerker LC, Maciejewski PK. Prolonged grief disorder:
a case for inclusion in DSM–V. In Handbook of Bereavement Research and
Practice: 21st Century Perspectives (eds M Stroebe, R Hansson, H Schut,
et al): 165–86. American Psychological Association Press, 2008.
Holly G. Prigerson, Paul K. Maciejewski Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Harvard
Medical School, and Statistics Core of the Center for Psycho-oncology & Palliative
Care Research, Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, 44 Binney Street, Smith 268, Boston,
MA 02115, USA. Email: Holly_Prigerson@dfci.harvard.edu
doi: 10.1192/bjp.194.6.561a
Taking an internet history
Cooney & Morris1 argue that we should consider taking an ‘inter-
net history’ to help assess young people’s risk of self-harm, suicide
and presumed psychopathologies such as ‘internet addiction’.
Although an understanding of how a client uses the internet
may be important, the authors caricature what we know about
the risks of the internet.
Although information on suicide methods is available online,2
there is currently no clear evidence that the risk of self-harm or
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suicidal behaviour is raised by ‘pro-suicide’ internet sites, as we
lack all but the most preliminary studies in this area. Those
studies that have been completed, in line with earlier research
on ‘pro-anorexia’ sites, reported that ‘pro-self-injury’ boards relay
mixed messages – clearly providing social support, coping
methods and understanding, but also tending to minimise the
significance of self-harming behaviour.3 On the basis of current
evidence, we might hypothesise that the use of such websites could
equally be a protective factor or a risk factor.
The authors also mention internet addiction but seem
unaware that the existing research is based on inconsistent criteria,
is subject to widespread sample bias, relies almost entirely on
correlative studies,4 and that the concept itself lacks conceptual
validity.5 I challenge the authors to find any empirical studies to
support their claim that in Asia ‘cardiopulmonary-related deaths
and even game-related murders in internet cafes are now regarded
as serious public health issues’.
I wholeheartedly support the authors’ contention that
clinicians should consider the role of the internet in the lives of
patients, but I would stress that this needs to be done with an
understanding of the relevant research literature and a working
knowledge of both the technology and culture of the medium.
We ask no less in other areas of clinical work and this is
particularly important in a time when fears about the internet
are amplified by the media with little regard to the evidence
base.
1 Cooney GM, Morris J. Time to start taking an internet history? Br J Psychiatry
2009; 194: 185.
2 Recupero PR, Harms SE, Noble JM. Googling suicide: surfing for suicide
information on the Internet. J Clin Psychiatry 2008; 69: 878–88.
3 Whitlock JL, Powers JL, Eckenrode J (2006) The virtual cutting edge: the
internet and adolescent self-injury. Dev Psychol 2006; 42: 407–17.
4 Byun S, Ruffini C, Mills JE, Douglas AC, Niang M, Stepchenkova S, et al (2008)
Internet addiction: metasynthesis of 1996–2006 quantitative research.
Cyberpsychol Behav 2008; Epub ahead of print.
5 Bell V. Online information, extreme communities and internet therapy:
Is the internet good for our mental health? J Ment Health 2007; 16:
445–57.
Vaughan Bell, Institute of Psychiatry, Box P078, De Crespigny Park, London SE5 8AF,
UK. Email: Vaughan.Bell@iop.kcl.ac.uk
doi: 10.1192/bjp.194.6.561b
Authors’ reply: We welcome Dr Bell’s interest in our letter and
would be happy to debate the issue – but find ourselves entirely in
agreement with him. He makes some crucial points which we too
would emphasise. In particular, we all share the ‘contention that
clinicians should consider the role of the internet in the lives of
patients’. We too ‘would stress that this needs to be done with
an understanding of the relevant research literature and a working
knowledge of both the technology and culture of the medium.’
Sadly, there is too little sound evidence to inform our attitudes.
Bell argues rightly that internet use could ‘equally be a
protective factor’ and indeed one of us (J.M.) has participated
in research exploiting the potential for delivering therapy via the
web.
Bell is right in suggesting that until we have a better
understanding of the complex and subtle influences which may
be disseminated by the medium of the internet – and indeed by
other communication media too – we and our colleagues are likely
to fall into the trap of caricaturing both risks and benefits of
internet use.
We are certainly aware that the term ‘internet addiction’ is
itself a caricature of a diagnosis rather than a well-explored entity,
but in the absence of empirical studies we are obliged to rely on
anecdotal evidence. It has been as a result of some distressing
clinical experiences, as well as concerns raised sensationally rather
than scientifically in the media, that we have been moved to
highlight the issue and to embark on our own preliminary studies.
Our letter does not aim to re-ignite a debate on whether the
internet is helpful or harmful. As Dr Bell has observed, such a
reductionist approach belies the complexity and variety of
internet-based activities, any of which may have an influence in
either direction.1 We instead reflect that without empirical data
to inform us, and where there is the possibility of either risk or
benefit, careful and sensitive questioning of patients with high
internet use may be a valuable component of a full psychiatric
assessment.
The internet has taken a central place in modern culture
particularly among younger people. Although we may not fully
understand the complex interactions of the web and mental
health, and while we await research to enlighten us, we are left
with the choice to either ignore or engage with this phenomenon.
Legislators, mental health advocates,2 concerned parents and
media journalists have all focused their efforts. It is time for
scientists and clinicians to follow suit. In our view, this begins with
the careful taking of an internet history.
1 Bell V. Online information, extreme communities and internet therapy: Is the
internet good for our mental health? J Ment Health 2007; 16: 445–57.
2 Papyrus: Prevention of Young Suicide. 2008 (http://www.papyrus-uk.org/
news.html).
Gary M. Cooney, The University of Edinburgh, UK. Email: garycooney@gmail.com;
Jane Morris, Royal Edinburgh Hospital, UK
doi: 10.1192/bjp.194.6.562
Dementia: suicide by drowning
Purandare et al’s article on suicide in dementia is a valuable
contribution to suicide research in the elderly, particularly in those
with dementia.1 The authors have already dealt with a number of
methodological limitations quite succinctly. One important
limitation in particular is the choice of controls. As the authors
rightly stated, a control group of patients with dementia who
had not died by suicide would have been more appropriate.
In the Method section, the authors referred to ICD–10 only
and not ICD–9. As far as I am aware from my own experience
dealing with the Office for National Statistics (ONS), ICD–10
has been used by ONS only since 2001. Prior to this date and
for the first 5 years of Purandare et al’s study period (1996–
2000), the ONS used ICD–9. If the authors applied the same
criteria in their selection of suicide and open verdicts in cases
reported between April 1996 and December 2000, then I assume
they would have selected: ICD–9 E950–E959 for suicide and
E980–989 excluding E988.8 for open verdicts respectively in a
similar manner as they did with ICD–10 (p. 175). However, this
very relevant fact does not appear to have been mentioned or
explained by the authors, and was quite possibly omitted from
the manuscript in error. However, this omission, which covers
5 years of a 9-year study, ought to be acknowledged and duly
corrected.
I am grateful that the paper provides the opportunity to make
one or two comments on some issues relating to drowning as a
method of suicide in the elderly. Suicide by drowning accounted
for 13.5% of total elderly suicide, being the third commonest
cause of death in elderly suicide in England and Wales during
1979–2001 (16% for women as the second commonest cause of
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death after overdose in elderly female suicide and 12% for men)
and the fourth commonest cause of death by suicide in elderly
males.2 Interestingly, Purandare et al’s findings clearly show that
drowning is the second commonest method of suicide by elderly
psychiatric patients, with or without a dementia diagnosis.
The diagnosis of drowning itself may be difficult as there are
no specific features at autopsy.3 During the investigation of a body
found in water, a wide range of possibilities other than downing
have to be considered: accident, suicide, misadventure or
homicide. Even when the diagnosis of drowning is confirmed
(or excluded) the manner of death may remain undetermined.3
It is also difficult to determine whether underlying natural
diseases play a role in the death, wrongly regarded as self-harm.4
There are some examples of this; ‘sudden death in bathroom’
has been reported,5 occurring mostly in winter and 80% of cases
were elderly persons who died while bathing. Cardiac arrest and
subsequent drowning in bathtubs were attributed to the sudden
reduction in blood pressure and cardiac arrhythmia, and not
due to fatal self-harm.5 Drowning has also been attributed to
sudden unexpected death in epilepsy either subsequent to a
seizure or occurring suddenly without explanation.6 It may be
relevant that in a local study in Cheshire, UK, bathroom drowning
accounted for 7% of all elderly drowning.7 Niacin deficiency,
similar to pellagra, has been reported in high-income countries
in people with alcohol dependency with poor eating habits
and self-neglect, malabsorption, malignancy and nutritional
deficiencies.8 It may be reasonable to assume that some elderly
people with dementia, especially those who live alone, develop
mental and physical changes due to an easily overlooked
nicotinamide deficiency which could result in accidental drowning
in an attempt to alleviate skin irritation as is the case in some
pellagra sufferers.2 It is interesting to note that Lunetta et al3
reported that 2.6% of bodies found in water were found to have
died of natural causes after an initially suspected suicide. A review
of trends in elderly suicide by drowning in England and Wales
1979–2001 revealed that suicide by drowning in the elderly
attracted only 38% verdicts of suicide but 62% open verdict.2
The high rate of open verdicts in death by drowning compared
with any other method of fatal self-harm in England and Wales
simply confirms the difficulties in reaching a firm conclusion in
drowning death. Combining suicide and all undetermined deaths
in suicide by drowning as a matter of course, especially in
nationally collected statistics and consequently in research, may
result in grossly exaggerated rates and misleading trends. Suicide
by drowning is probably not amenable to prevention and although
the elderly are often thought to benefit from suicide prevention
more than younger adults, this is not likely to be the case
regarding drowning, perhaps sadly more so in those with
dementia.
1 Purandare N, Oude Voshaar RC, Rodway C, Bickley H, Burns A, Kapur N.
Suicide in dementia: 9-year national clinical survey in England and Wales.
Br J Psychiatry 2009; 194: 175–80.
2 Salib E. Trends in suicide by drowning in the elderly in England and Wales
1979–2001. Int J Geriatr Psychiatry 2005; 19: 175–81.
3 Lunetta P, Smith G, Pentilla A, Sajanntila A. Undetermined drowning. Med Sci
Law 2003; 43: 207–14.
4 Byard RW, Houldsworth G, James RA, Gilbert JD. Characteristic features of
suicidal drowning: a 20 year study. Am J Forensic Med Pathol 2001; 22:
134–8.
5 Yoshioka N, Chiba T, Yamauchi M, Monma T, Yoshioki K. Forensic
consideration of death in the bathtub. Leg Med 2003; 5 (Supp 1): 375–81.
6 Lathers CM, Schraeder PL. Clinical pharmacology: drugs as a benefit
and/or risk in sudden unexpected death in epilepsy? J Clin Pharmacol 2002;
42: 123–36.
7 Salib E, Rahim S, El-Nimr G, Habeeb B. Elderly suicide: an analysis of
coroner’s inquests into two hundred cases in Cheshire 1989–2001. Med Sci
Law 2005; 45: 71–80.
8 Kumar P, Clark ML. Nutrition. In Clinical Medicine: 163–4. Baillie`re Tindall,
1994.
Emad Salib, Peasley Cross Hospital, St Helens WA9 3DA, UK.
Email: esalib@hotmail.com
doi: 10.1192/bjp.194.6.562a
Purandare et al1 used National Confidential Inquiry data to
compare the characteristics of dementia patients who died by
suicide with those of age-matched suicides with other diagnoses.
They say empirical data on suicide in dementia are scarce and
largely based upon case reports. Although the literature in this
area contains a number of interesting, albeit highly atypical, case
reports of patients with less common subtypes of dementia who
died by suicide, there are also a substantial number of reports
on suicide in older adults with various psychiatric diagnoses.
The real problem with this literature is the quality of the studies;
the majority are methodologically flawed, for example not
employing a sensitive method for detecting mild cognitive
impairment or absence of a control group, also use of coroner’s
records or death certificates to determine psychiatric diagnoses,
sources known to underreport cases of dementia. The overall
finding from this literature is that suicide appears to be
uncommon in dementia, although the risk in Huntington’s disease
is in the region of threefold compared with the general
population.2 However, in a recent cohort study based on Danish
case registers, it was found that for younger patients (50–69 years)
diagnosed with dementia during psychiatric hospitalisation the
risk of suicide was over eight times that of the age-matched
general population, and the risk was threefold for patients aged
over 70.3
Purandare et al1 report suicide in dementia to be uncommon
in the first year following diagnosis and highlight 1–5 years after
first contact with services as the high-risk period. The case–control
design of their study used a convenient but not very informative
control group, namely age- and gender-matched suicides with
other psychiatric disorders, and consequently the findings do
not shed much new light on the association between suicide
and dementia. No information is provided about severity of
dementia or subtype (dementia subtype is of interest since fronto-
temporal dementia would be expected to be associated with
impulsive acts of suicide and self-harm, as frontal lobe
impairment is associated with impulsiveness). The finding that
suicide is less common soon after diagnosis is counter-intuitive,
and contrary to the findings of Erlangsen et al3 where suicide
was most common in the first 6 months after diagnosis. There
is also evidence that when attempted suicide occurs in dementia
it is more common in early, mild disease and when accompanied
by depression.4,5
1 Purandare N, Oude Voshaar RC, Rodway C, Bickley H, Burns A, Kapur N.
Suicide in dementia: 9-year national clinical survey in England and Wales. Br J
Psychiatry 2009; 194: 175–80.
2 Harris EC, Barraclough, BM. Suicide as an outcome for medical disorders.
Medicine 1994; 73: 281–96.
3 Erlangsen A, Zarit SH, Conwell Y. Hospital-diagnosed dementia and suicide: a
longitudinal study using prospective, nationwide register data. Am J Geriatr
Psychiatry 2008; 16: 220–8.
4 Tsai CF, Tsai SJ, Yang CH, Hwang JP. Chinese demented inpatients admitted




5 Osvath P, Kovacs A, Voros V, Fekete S. Risk factors of attempted suicide in
the elderly: the role of cognitive impairment. Int J Psychiatry Clin Practice
2005; 9: 221–5.
Camilla Haw, St Andrew’s Healthcare, Billing Road, Northampton NN1 5DG.
Email: chaw@standrew.co.uk
doi: 10.1192/bjp.194.6.563
Authors’ reply: We welcome the interest in our study of suicide
in patients with dementia in England and Wales. We found
relatively lower risk of suicide during the first year of illness in
dementia. Dr Haw writes that our findings are contrary to
findings by Erlangsen et al.1 However, such comparison is
inaccurate. Erlangsen et al compared the risk of suicide in patients
who were diagnosed with dementia during hospitalisation for
physical or psychiatric illness with the risk of suicide in the general
population. The authors point out that ‘the findings cannot be
generalised to persons with dementia who have not received the
diagnosis while hospitalised’. The risk of suicide is known to be
increased around the time of psychiatric hospitalisation.2
Psychiatric in-patients would be expected to have more psychiatric
disturbances. The study by Tsai et al,3 which Haw quotes to
support the association with mild dementia, found that delusions
were present in all seven of those who later died by suicide. Haw
also seems to compare the literature on increased risk of
attempted suicide in those with mild cognitive impairment with
our study of completed suicide in patients with diagnosed
dementia. One consideration during disclosure of the diagnosis
of dementia is the potential for adverse reactions. Our findings
suggest that unless the risk assessment, which should be done in
any patient being given a diagnosis of a major physical or mental
illness, identifies a specific suicide risk, the ‘fear of suicide’ should
not be a major factor in the decision to not disclose the diagnosis
of dementia.
We thank Salib who correctly points out that our Method
omitted ICD–9 which was indeed the classification system in
use by the Office of National Statistics in the earlier part of the
study. The relevant ICD–9 codes were E950–E959 and E980–989
(excluding E988.8).
Our findings are based on National Confidential Inquiry data, so
include individuals who died by suicide within 12 months of contact
with specialist health services. When we examined general popu-
lation deaths (suicide and undetermined verdicts) in older people
during the period covered by this study, drowning was the third
most common method of suicide overall after hanging and self-
poisoning (National Confidential Inquiry into Suicide and Homi-
cide, personal communication, 2009). This is consistent with Salib’s
findings. We agree that the method of suicide may be an import-
ant determinant of verdict and there are difficulties in establishing
suicide as a cause in drowning. However, this does not affect our
main findings, which are based on the conventional definitions of
suicide used in previous research and national statistics.
Suicide prevention requires a variety of strategies.4 Although
we agree that restricting access to drowning as a method of suicide
may not be feasible, we do not agree that suicide prevention is
futile in this group. Other strategies, for example the improved
assessment and treatment of mental disorders, are likely to be
worthwhile. We do not accept that younger individuals may be less
amenable to prevention. However, different age groups may
require a different preventive emphasis.5
1 Erlangsen A, Zarit SH, Conwell Y. Hospital-diagnosed dementia and suicide: a
longitudinal study using prospective, nationwide register data. Am J Geriatr
Psychiatry 2008; 16: 220–8.
2 Qin P, Nordentoft M. Suicide risk in relation to psychiatric hospitalization:
evidence based on longitudinal registers. Arch Gen Psychiatry 2005; 62:
427–32.
3 Tsai CF, Tsai SJ, Yang CH, Hwang JP. Chinese demented inpatients admitted
following a suicide attempt: a case series. Int J Geriatr Psychiatry 2007; 22:
1106–9.
4 Department of Health. National Suicide Prevention Strategy for England.
Department of Health, 2002.
5 Hunt IM, Kapur N, Robinson J, Shaw J, Flynn S, Bailey H, et al. Suicide within
12 months of mental health service contact in different age and diagnostic
groups: national clinical survey. Br J Psychiatry 2006; 188: 135–42.
Nitin Purandare, Psychiatry Research Group, School of Community Based Medicine,
The University of Manchester, Room 3.319, University Place (3rd Floor East),
Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL. Email: nitin.purandare@manchester.ac.uk;
Richard C. Oude Voshaar, University of Manchester, Psychiatry Research Group,
School of Community Based Medicine, UK, and Radboud University Nijmegen Medical
Centre, Department of Psychiatry, Nijmegen, The Netherlands; Cathryn Rodway,
Harriet Bickley, University of Manchester, Centre for Suicide Prevention, UK;
Alistair Burns, University of Manchester, Psychiatry Research Group, School of
Community Based Medicine, UK; Nav Kapur, University of Manchester, Centre for
Suicide Prevention, UK.
doi: 10.1192/bjp.194.6.564
Adolescent-onset anorexia nervosa – missing half
of the story?
As a psychiatrist working in an eating disorder service, I am always
intrigued by the stability of the eating disorder diagnosis over
time. As quoted by Treasure et al,1 ‘when long-term prognosis is
considered, the overlap between anorexia nervosa and bulimia
nervosa becomes more striking’. We all know that patients
diagnosed with anorexia later switch over to other eating disorders
and vice versa.2 Hence, the paper about long-term outcome of
anorexia nervosa3 attracted my attention. The methodology of
recruiting is vital in a population-based study. Wentz et al have
taken extreme steps to be as rigorous as possible. But I consider
that they might have overlooked some of the aspects. The authors
have described how the diagnosis of individual patients has
changed over time from anorexia nervosa to bulimia nervosa to
no eating disorder to eating disorder not otherwise specified
(EDNOS) (their Fig.1). This highlights the diagnostic instability
of these groups of illnesses. The authors have assessed individuals
cross-sectionally and asserted them to have anorexia nervosa. The
important information missing here is whether these individuals
had symptoms of other eating disorders such as EDNOS before
having symptoms of anorexia. Since the study is about long-term
outcome of anorexia nervosa, Wentz et al should have taken
adequate care to ascertain that the cohort they were following
did in fact belong to the anorexia nervosa group. This drawback
is further highlighted in the exclusion criteria of the study.
Excluding patients at the initial stage (Study 1) of individuals with
a history of eating disturbances could have excluded individuals
who might have been suffering from a non-anorexic type of eating
disorder. The authors assert that in the subsequent study they did
not exclude patients who crossed over to other eating disorders
(thereby promptly registering changes prospectively), but what
they did by excluding certain people is to exclude these potential
participants who could have shown crossing over from another
type of eating disorder to anorexia nervosa.
There are other minor points that are worth mentioning.
Comprehensive screening, that would have included patients of
all severity, of individuals who were born in a particular year
(1970), identified 24 cases of anorexia nervosa. Combining this
with a less comprehensively assessed group of individuals (and
thereby potentially picking up only very severe cases) could have
resulted in heterogeneous populations being mixed. Instead of
mixing these two cohorts with potential difference in their severity
with a possible impact over their outcome including
complications,4 the authors could have treated them as two
564
Correspondence
groups. I was also wondering about the validity of making a
personality disorder diagnosis in such young individuals. Overall,
if the diagnosis of anorexia could become bulimia, EDNOS or no
eating disorder, the authors failed to consider the reverse being
true (with the relative exception of bulimia to anorexia) at the
important initial stage of this study.
1 Treasure J, Schmidt U, van Furth E (eds) Handbook of Eating Disorders (2nd
edn): 2. John Wiley & Sons, 2003.
2 Eddy KT, Dorer DJ, Franko DL, Tahilani K, Thompson-Brenner H, Herzog DB.
Diagnostic crossover in anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa: implications
for DSM–V. Am J Psychiatry 2008; 165: 245–50.
3 Wentz E, Gillberg IC, Anckarsa¨ter H, Gillberg C, Ra˚stam M. Adolescent-onset
anorexia nervosa: 18-year outcome. Br J Psychiatry 2009; 194: 168–74.
4 Bulik CM, Thornton L, Pinheiro AP, Plotnicov K, Klump KL, Brandt H,
et al. Suicide attempts in anorexia nervosa. Psychosom Med 2008; 70:
378–83.
Murali K. Sekar, Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust, UK.
Email: drmurali98@yahoo.com
doi: 10.1192/bjp.194.6.564a
Authors’ reply: Dr Sekar has concerns that the individuals in
our study had other eating disorders before the onset of anorexia
in adolescence. The aim of the original study, that took place in
1985, was to investigate the prevalence of adolescent-onset
anorexia (and to examine background factors in this sample),
not the prevalence of bulimia nervosa or eating disorder not
otherwise specified. The mothers of the individuals, who were
diagnosed with anorexia at the time of the original study, were
interviewed thoroughly regarding premorbid eating disturbances.1
Furthermore, the individuals themselves were interviewed
regarding the same topic. No individual in the anorexia group
(or the comparison group) had another eating disorder before
the onset of anorexia. The school nurses at the schools in
Go¨teborg continued to follow all pupils born in 1970 regarding
weight and height until leaving school, usually after age 18 years.
In the process, individuals with a later adolescent-onset of
anorexia were also found. We believe that we have missed no cases
of anorexia born in 1970 with anorexia onset before age 18 years.
Since the original study focused on adolescent-onset anorexia we
have not continued the screening of individuals born in 1970 after
leaving school. Mean age of anorexia onset in our sample was 14.3
years. Bulimia typically presents during or after late adolescence
and it is rare for onset to occur before the age of 14 years.2,3
The study has a prospective and not a cross-sectional design,
i.e. we have examined all individuals at four occasions, but we
have interviewed them both regarding current eating disorders
(and other psychiatric disorders) as well as eating disorders during
the follow-up period.4,5 Data regarding eating disorders during
the last follow-up period, between Study III and Study IV, are
available from the first author.
Dr Sekar is also worried about the two subgroups being too
diverse; the birth cohort with individuals born in 1970 was pooled
together with a group of individuals with adolescent-onset
anorexia born in adjacent years (in most cases 1971–1973). In
the original study, the two groups were compared using several
hundred background parameters and found to be similar in
virtually all key respects.1
The use of personality disorder diagnoses with teenagers is
arguable, but we considered (and still consider) it justifiable in
cases persistently (over a period of several years) showing the
essential characteristics of a personality disorder described in the
DSM–III–R (the diagnostic manual used at the time of the
original study). This is explicitly suggested by DSM–III–R
guidelines. In the original study, apart from the age criterion, all
DSM–III–R criteria had to be fulfilled for a diagnosis of
personality disorder to be made. All individuals receiving a
diagnosis of personality disorder showed significant impairment
in social functioning and/or subjective distress.1
To conclude, since the aim of the original study was to
investigate prevalence of adolescent-onset anorexia, we did not
screen for other eating disorders. Nevertheless, from the time of
entering our study, all participants (anorexia group and
comparison group) were examined in great detail regarding eating
disorders (past, present, and longitudinally at several follow-up
occasions). We believe that we can safely say that there were no
individuals who had crossed-over from another eating disorder
to anorexia before the onset of anorexia in adolescence.
1 Rastam M. Anorexia nervosa in 51 Swedish adolescents: premorbid problems
and comorbidity. J Am Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry 1992; 31: 819–29.
2 Bryant-Waugh R, Lask B. Eating disorders in children. J Child Psychol
Psychiatry 1995; 36: 191–202.
3 Keski-Rahkonen A, Hoek HW, Linna MS, Raevuori A, Sihvola E, Bulik CM, et al.
Incidence and outcomes of bulimia nervosa: a nationwide population-based
study. Psychol Med 2008; 8: 1–9.
4 Rastam M, Gillberg IC, Gillberg C. Anorexia nervosa 6 years after onset.
Part II. Comorbid psychiatric problems. Compr Psychiatry 1995; 36: 70–6.
5 Wentz E, Gillberg C, Gillberg IC, Rastam M. Ten-year follow-up of adolescent-
onset anorexia nervosa: psychiatric disorders and overall functioning scales.
J Child Psychol Psychiatry 2001; 42: 613–22.
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Adolescent Psychiatry, Lund University, Sweden, and Institute of Neuroscience and
Physiology, Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Go¨teborg University, Sweden
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Fallacies in standardised mortality ratios
in anorexia nervosa
The article by Papadopoulos et al1 adds to the evidence of high
mortality rates in anorexia nervosa. An impressively large cohort
was obtained through the Swedish Cause-of-Death Register which
includes all Swedish persons who died since 1952. The crude
mortality rate for 6009 females with at least one hospital
admission for anorexia nervosa was 4.41% over a mean follow-
up of 13.4 years (averaging 0.33% per annum). This rate compares
favourably with other studies (0.5–2.2% per annum),2 yet the
authors, after much manipulation of their data, conclude that
the mortality rate in Swedish women was ‘astonishingly’ high.
We contest this finding based on misleading calculations of
standardised mortality ratios (SMRs). Standardised mortality
ratios are a means of comparing mortality in a specified patient
population with a standard population. The SMR value will
exceed 1 in proportion to the risk of death from the disease under
study.
The authors have two different usages of SMR. The first is the
customary one when the calculation is applied to a cohort of
persons who have been given a specific diagnosis at the outset.
In Table 3 this SMR is given as 6.2 for the 6009 patients with
anorexia nervosa, among whom there occurred 265 deaths
whereas the expected deaths were 42.6. So far, so good.
Their second approach was to count the number of deaths
according to each specific cause of death, yielding a different kind
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of SMR. For example, there were 84 suicides yielding an SMR of
13.6, signifying that suicide was 13.6 times more common among
the cohort of patients with anorexia nervosa than generally
expected. Similarly, the SMR for deaths due to respiratory disease
was 11.5. But the SMR for anorexia nervosa as a cause of death
was said to be 650.0 and it is this figure which leads the authors
to conclude the death rate in their sample was astonishingly high.
So it would be if it had clinical and statistical validity. The
authors’ errors arise from estimating the SMR for a subgroup
(n=39) of the original cohort using the fraction:
observed number of deaths
number of expected deaths
The numerator is given as 39 patients in whom anorexia
nervosa was the main cause of death on the death certificate. It
is the denominator which is elusive in its estimated value. It is
given as 0.1 but the authors’ own data suggest this is an
approximation for 0.06, a very low figure which results in an
inflated value for the SMR (650) in this ambiguous subgroup of
anorexia nervosa. We suggest that when an underlying cause of
death (e.g. suicide, respiratory infection) was not identified, the
certifier of the death entered anorexia nervosa on recognising a
cachectic state, especially as malnutrition does not feature in the
list of ‘underlying’ causes.
These objections do not apply to the first calculation of the
SMR in the full cohort of patients with anorexia nervosa whose
value was found to be 6.2, by no means an astonishing death rate.
1 Papadopoulos FC, Ekbom A, Brandt L, Ekselius L. Excess mortality, causes of
death and prognostic factors in anorexia nervosa. Br J Psychiatry 2009; 194:
10–7.
2 Ramsay R, Ward A, Treasure J, Russell GF. Compulsory treatment in anorexia
nervosa. Short-term benefits and long-term mortality. Br J Psychiatry 1999;
175: 147–53.
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Authors’ reply: Professor Russell and Dr Ward raise the issue of
the suspected erroneously inflated value for SMR (650) for the
subgroup of women in whom anorexia nervosa was stated as
the underlying cause of death on the death certificate in our
paper.1 The expected number of deaths for this subgroup was
indeed 0.06 (denominator) as they point out and it was presented
with its one decimal approximation (0.1). Russell & Ward further
suggest that the certifiers of the death would be prone to enter
anorexia nervosa on the death certificate when a specific
underlying cause of death could not be identified but a cachectic
state was evident. We agree that this could be true, but we do not
believe that such ‘misclassification’ would be problematic if those
women had an active anorexia nervosa at the time of death. On
the contrary, it would be worrisome if women with other
diagnoses that lead to cachectic states (other than anorexia
nervosa) were misclassified as anorexia nervosa on death
certificates, but our inclusion criteria were specifically selected in
order to reduce this possibility. In addition, we believe that the
estimation of the SMR value for this specific subgroup of patients
does not confer more information than what common sense
dictates, namely that those with a lifetime diagnosis of anorexia
have a much higher risk of dying from it.
Overall, women with anorexia nervosa in our cohort had a
sixfold increased mortality compared with the general population.
This excess mortality in anorexia nervosa is two to three times
higher when compared with the excess mortality observed in
mental disorders in general2 and more specifically in schizo-
phrenia,3 bipolar and unipolar disorder.4 Moreover, we would like
to point out that we were most astonished by the persistence of
this unfavourable outcome throughout the lifetime, with high
SMRs for both natural and unnatural causes of death even 20
years or more after the first admission for anorexia nervosa.
1 Papadopoulos FC, Ekbom A, Brandt L, Ekselius L. Excess mortality, causes of
death and prognostic factors in anorexia nervosa. Br J Psychiatry 2009; 194:
10–7.
2 Valenti M, Necozione S, Busellu G, Borrelli G, Lepore AR, Madonna R, et al.
Mortality in psychiatric hospital patients: a cohort analysis of prognostic
factors. Int J Epidemiol 1997; 26: 1227–35.
3 Saha S, Chant D, McGrath J. A systematic review of mortality in
schizophrenia: is the differential mortality gap worsening over time? Arch
Gen Psychiatry 2007; 64: 1123–31.
4 Osby U, Brandt L, Correia N, Ekbom A, Spare´n P. Excess mortality in bipolar
and unipolar disorder in Sweden. Arch Gen Psychiatry 2001; 58: 844–50.
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Suicide rates in people of South Asian origin
in England and Wales
A notable finding in McKenzie et al’s study1 of suicide rates in
people of South Asian origin is that the high relative rates in
younger Asian women reported in previous research studies are
found in the 1993–98 data-set but not that for 1999–2003, which
shows high relative rates for Asian women over 65. In discussing
their results, the investigators acknowledge potential problems
with the study’s methodology, including the numerator (how well
the SANGRA name recognition algorithm ascertains individuals
of South Asian origin in more recent samples) and denominator
(the validity of a linear interpolation of numbers over their
period). However, perhaps cautions are required with respect to
the overall robustness of the SANGRA algorithm and the issue
of numerator/denominator compatibility: the numerator uses an
operational definition of ethnicity (derived from name
information) and the denominator is based on self-assignment
by individuals to census categories.
These matters are brought into focus in the derivation of
denominators. The investigators use the counts for the 1991
categories ‘Bangladeshi’, ‘Indian’, ‘Pakistani’ and 2001 categories
‘Asian or Asian British: Bangladeshi, Indian, Pakistani’. They also
include the 2001 category ‘White and Asian’ (numbering around
190 000 in the census) on the grounds that people in it ‘ . . . could
be identified by SANGRA if any of their names were of South
Asian origin’. We have no systematic data on how offspring of
these inter-ethnic unions are named, although qualitative research
has revealed the complexity of the process.2 Inclusion of the
‘White and Asian’ category also introduces heterogeneity into
the South Asian collectivity. Evidence from the Office of National
Statistics (ONS) Longitudinal Study for members having a 1991
and 2001 ethnic group showed that half (49.0%) of the 993 ‘White
and Asian’ persons identified as ‘White’ in 1991 and just 9.5%
identified as one of the three South Asian groups.3 Similarly, in
recent research half in the ‘White and Asian’ group prioritised
‘White’ when asked to name just one ethnic group that
contributes most strongly to their identity. Our collective
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identities affect our ability to make an individual life and have
relevance in the context of suicide risk.
The investigators exclude ‘Other Asian’ (the free-text ‘Any
other Asian background’ under the ‘Asian or Asian British’
label, numbering around 240 000 in the 2001 census) from the
denominator ‘because the majority of this group are of Middle
Eastern or Sri Lankan origin’. Although around one in four were
born in Sri Lanka and one in six in the Middle East, 37% had a
region of birth in South Asia and 31% in the UK.4 Given that
the focus is on ethnicity rather than country of birth, the ONS
Longitudinal Study data are, again, informative: of members with
a 1991 and 2001 ethnic group, 42% of 1285 ‘Other Asian’ persons
identified as Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi in 1991. In this study,
none from the ‘Other Asian’ group are counted in the denominator.
Finally, the investigators point out that SANGRAwas validated
against real data. However, the key data-set were London and
Midlands hospital in-patient admission data from the mid- to
late-90s, a period during which the quality of ethnic coding was
very poor, the team itself admitting that further studies are needed
to confirm whether SANGRA is able to produce valid results
across Britain.5
Beyond the parsimonious way in which the statistical data is
presented (with no measure of the precision of the rate estimates),
the collective effect of potential problems with numerator/
denominator compatibility and concerns about SANGRA’s
performance is a factor which needs to be considered in making
a judgement whether to accept these findings as the accurate
contemporary evidence needed to shape specific prevention
strategies.
1 McKenzie K, Bhui K, Nanchahal K, Blizard B. Suicide rates in people of South
Asian origin in England and Wales: 1993–2003. Br J Psychiatry 2008; 193:
406–9.
2 Edwards R, Caballero C. What’s in a name? An exploration of the significance
of personal naming of ‘mixed’ children for parents from different racial,
ethnic and faith backgrounds. Sociol Rev 2008; 56: 39–60.
3 Platt L, Simpson L, Akinwale B. Stability and change in ethnic groups in
England and Wales. Popul Trends 2005; 121: 35–46.
4 Gardener D, Connolly H. Who are the ‘Other’ Ethnic Groups? Office for
National Statistics, 2005.
5 Nanchahal K, Mangtani P, Alston M, dos Santos Silva I. Development and
validation of a computerised South Asian Names and Recognition Algorithm
(SANGRA) for use in British health-related studies. J Public Health Med 2001;
23: 278–85.
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McKenzie et al’s findings1 of low suicide rates among South Asian
men in both 1993–98 and 1999–2003, and of high suicide rates
among young South Asian women in 1993–98, are consistent with
previously reported findings.2 The difference from previous
findings lies in the absence of an excess in young South Asian
women in the recent period, 1999–2003, and an excess instead
in older women.
In the absence of observed numbers of deaths and confidence
intervals for the rates, it is not possible to interpret the statistical
significance of the findings in Tables 1 and 2 of their article
(i.e. which ethnic differences by age, gender and over time are
statistically significant). Likewise, although the results were
‘essentially unchanged’ following the sensitivity analysis, it is
unclear which differences remained statistically significant after
the 11% inflationary adjustment for potential underidentification
of South Asian suicides arising from the use of SANGRA.
High rates of suicide and attempted suicide among young
South Asian women have been a consistent and enduring finding
in national and international research over decades (see Raleigh2
for references). Research specifically commissioned to examine
this issue reported high rates of attempted suicide among young
South Asian women in London, including those who were
UK-born.3 A recent study found a 2.8-fold higher suicide rate
among South Asian women aged 25–39 in contact with mental
health services.4 Given the evidence overall, any decline in suicide
rates in this group over the past decade would therefore be
welcome. However, as this finding is counter to the evidence to
date, it should be kept under review to ensure it is a real trend
and not an artefact, given the caveats associated with
analyses based on software-assigned ethnicity, many of which
are acknowledged in the paper.
The constraints to inclusion of ethnicity at death registration
were established by ONS in its review of death certification some
years ago. Given the growing need for epidemiological monitoring
of mortality rates and trends by ethnicity and cause of death,
ONS, the Department of Health and the Information Centre
should consider alternative approaches for making these data
available, for example through data linkage, as undertaken in
Scotland and recently by ONS for deriving infant mortality rates
by ethnic group.5 This would provide sound, comprehensive
epidemiological data with self-assigned ethnicity coding of
numerators and population denominators on a consistent and
comparable basis, thereby avoiding the potential mismatch
between numerators and denominators in the use of name-
recognition software. It would also obviate the need for
researchers to have access to names, which is frequently not
possible for data protection reasons.
In the interim, given the growing use of such proxies for
epidemiological purposes, there is a strong case for these national
agencies to undertake a systematic review of the available name-
recognition software programs, to establish their robustness for
epidemiological analyses using national data-sets and across the
spectrum of morbidity and mortality. This would also be in
keeping with the statutory responsibility of these national agencies
for ensuring the availability of comprehensive national data to
support equality monitoring.
1 McKenzie K, Bhui K, Nanchahal K, Blizard B. Suicide rates in people of South
Asian origin in England and Wales: 1993–2003. Br J Psychiatry 2008; 193:
406–9.
2 Raleigh VS. Suicide patterns and trends in people of Indian subcontinent and
Caribbean origin in England and Wales. Ethn Health 1996; 1: 55–63.
3 Bhugra D, Desai M, Baldwin DS. Attempted suicide in west London I. Rates
across ethnic communities. Psychol Med 1999; 29: 1125–30.
4 Bhui K, McKenzie K. Rates and risk factors by ethnic group for suicides within
a year of contact with mental health services in England and Wales.
Psychiatr Serv 2008; 59: 414–20.
5 Office for National Statistics. Infant Mortality by Ethnic Group, England and
Wales, 2005. ONS, 2008 (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/StatBase/
Product.asp?vlnk=15111&Pos=1&ColRank=1&Rank=272).
Veena S. Raleigh, Postgraduate Medical School, University of Surrey, Guildford,
Surrey GU2 7XH. Email:veena.raleigh@helthcarecommision.org.uk
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Authors’ reply: Our paper is the first to report findings at
variance with previous studies and we welcome the opportunity
to discuss the findings and subject them to scientific scrutiny.1
The findings of a decreased rate of suicide in South Asian men
has not been challenged. It is reassuring that the experimental
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methods of SANGRA do not produce unexpected findings for
this group.
The comparison with our study of the National Confidential
Inquiry should be made cautiously, as that study included suicides
among people in contact with services rather than from all deaths
reported by the ONS.2 We would also suggest self-harm rates are
not a proxy for comparative suicide rates.
Dr Aspinall makes important comments about ethnicity
classification. There are no data that investigate self-assigned v.
ascribed ethnic identity and variations of this relationship across
geographical areas of the UK, over time, or the patterns of
transmission of ethnic identity through the generations. There
are often unpleasant trade-offs when using descriptors of ethnicity
and culture from survey research.3 Ethnicity is not a measure of
cultural identity.3 Perhaps nested within self-reported ethnic
categories we need more complex models of identity that take
account of acculturation, social stratification and their inter-
action.4 This may help more precisely to disentangle specific
influences on health. Unfortunately, the concepts and methods
to do this are still being developed.
The information on the denominators so far is useful but
incomplete to forge a new study design or recommend specific
changes in routine data sets; for example, we would need a
breakdown of self-reported ethnicity in the ‘Asian Other’ and
‘White and Asian’ categories by gender and age. Adding more
ethnic categories which are imprecisely measured, or for which
the difference between self-rated and ascribed may vary over time
and place, may lead to more random misclassification; therefore,
more ethnic categories may not always be helpful or explain any
more precisely which specific ethnic identity groups are at greater
or lesser risk.
The finding of high rates of suicide in young South Asian
women in the UK are based mainly on papers sampling groups
born in Southern Asia – using the same methodology would miss
the 50% of South Asians currently in the UK.1 Of the two studies
that used different methodologies, one used names to ascertain
South Asian suicides but the methodology was not validated or
described so that it could be replicated, and the other studied parts
of London, although we know that there are significant differences
in South Asian suicide rates by geographical location.5
The main purpose of the study was to improve the accuracy of
the estimate of suicide rates in all South Asian people living in the
UK, irrespective of place of birth. We know that over 50% of the
South Asian population was born in the UK and future studies
need a way of accurately including them in rate calculations. We
believe that ethnicity assigned on death certificates is likely to be
the most useful way forward. We concur with the view that there
is a need to assess trends over time.
We agree that there are caveats because of the SANGRA
program. However, we do not think that the program would have
worked less well in the 1999–2003 cohorts than the 1993–98, that
it would work so differentially for men and women, or that
artefact can explain the findings in both the older and the younger
female population.
We would welcome attempts to replicate these findings using
different methodologies and show the raw data to facilitate this
and the calculation of other statistics such as confidence intervals
(Table 1). However, in the meantime, this is the first contem-
porary attempt to ascertain the suicide rates for the whole of
the UK South Asian population. The findings for older women
should be viewed with concern and the drop in younger women
should be replicated and followed over time. Policy has to be
based on the best evidence available rather than the best evidence
that is sought and might one day become available.
1 McKenzie K, Bhui K, Nanchahal K, Blizard B.Suicide rates in people of South
Asian origin in England and Wales: 1993–2003. Br J Psychiatry 2008; 193:
406–9.
2 Bhui K, McKenzie K. Rates and risk factors by ethnic group for suicides within
a year of contact with mental health services in England and Wales.
Psychiatr Serv 2008; 59: 414–20.
3 McKenzie K, Crowcroft NS. Describing race, ethnicity and culture in medical
research BMJ 1996; 312: 1504.
4 Bhui K, Khatib Y, Viner R, Klineberg E, Clark C, Head J, et al. Cultural identity,
clothing and common mental disorder: a prospective school-based study of
white British and Bangladeshi adolescents. J Epidemiol Community Health
2008; 62: 435–41.
5 Neeleman J, Wessley S. Ethnic minority suicide: a small area geographical
study in south London. Psychol Med 1999; 29: 429–36.
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Risperidone for adolescent schizophrenia
We would like to make a few comments on the study by Haas et al1
which compares the efficacy and safety of two dosing regimes of
risperidone. First, we would like to raise concerns with regard to
the design of the study. Both groups were receiving a flexible dose
of risperidone in the first 4 weeks. The dose was to remain stable
only during the last 4 weeks – a very short duration. Patients
started showing substantial response in the first week onwards.
It is not possible to rule out the placebo effect and difficult to
determine the dose-related response. Surely this design cannot
establish the optimal effective dose as the dose was changing very
often especially in the first 4 weeks.
Second, patients in the control group were not allowed the
assured effective treatment. The control group received
risperidone tenfold less than the intervention group. This dose
was as good as a placebo. This raises serious doubts as to whether
the lower dose was also effective or whether it was a placebo effect.
This is clearly evident as a substantial improvement compared
with baseline was noted in both groups within 7 days. It also raises
ethical issues as the authors decided to continue a presumably
ineffective dose (0.15–0.6mg/day) in the control group for 8
weeks.2 Patients in this group had a higher discontinuation rate
owing to lack of efficacy. It was unethical to continue with such
568
Correspondence
Table 1 SANGRA South Asian Suicides 1993–2003



















a low dose. We also wonder why the authors arbitrarily decided to
have a tenfold lower dose in the control group. We question why
the authors did not try to compare the intervention drug with an
existing drug such as olanzapine, as Hill3 reports that the key
point is how a new treatment compares with existing treatment
rather than whether it is better than nothing.
1 Haas M, Eerdekens M, Kushner S, Singer J, Augustyns I, Quiroz J, et al.
Efficacy, safety and tolerability of two risperidone dosing regimens in
adolescent schizophrenia: double-blind study. Br J Psychiatry 2009; 194:
158–64.
2 World Medical Association. World Medical Association Declaration of
Helsinki. Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects.
WMA, 2008.
3 Hill AB. Medical ethics and controlled trials. BMJ 1963; 1: 1043–9.
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Authors’ reply: Several of the limitations of our study design as
mentioned by Jainer & Mahood have been addressed within the
publication’s discussion. The study was not designed to establish
an optimal dose or evaluate efficacy v. placebo. Thus, as we noted,
no conclusions can be made in this regard. The objective of this
study was to determine whether there was a difference between
two dose ranges; this goal was achieved. The use of an active
comparator was not possible because there was no drug approved
for use in children or adolescents suffering from this disorder at
the time the study was conducted.
The dose ranges were chosen to compare the adult therapeutic
dose, known to be effective in schizophrenia, with a low dose. This
low dose was presumed subtherapeutic, but not known to be
ineffective. Notably, in studies in children with disruptive
behaviour disorder where the allowable flexible dose range
included doses 50.6mg/day, risperidone was shown to be
efficacious.1,2 Additionally, at the time this study was designed,
a low-dose comparator was preferred over placebo, although
thinking on the appropriateness of using placebo control in
studies of antipsychotics has evolved since then.3 A placebo effect
in terms of treatment response cannot be ruled out in our study,
and presumably any placebo response would have affected both
dose arms similarly. Numerous safeguards were implemented to
minimise risk to patients in the study from the outset. The
protocol was reviewed by and received approval from an
independent ethics committee and individual institutional review
boards. All patients and caregivers were advised that both doses
were experimental and the lower dose might be an ineffective
treatment. Accordingly, all enrolled patients were initially
hospitalised and only adequately stabilised patients could be
discharged to continue in the trial as out-patients. Patients could
discontinue treatments at any time. All patients were monitored
closely throughout the duration of the trial to further ensure
patient safety.
Our conclusions remain valid, as they pertain to the
comparative favourable efficacy benefits achieved in this study
with risperidone treatment in the 1.5–6.0mg/day dose range
compared with the lower range. Both regimens were well tolerated
with low discontinuation rates due to adverse events.
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Time to change concepts and terminology
The proposal by van Os to introduce ‘salience dysregulation
syndrome’1 to describe the psychosis spectrum, replacing schizo-
phrenia and bipolar disorder, represents an acceptance that such
terms have outlived their usefulness. But by introducing three
subcategories, ‘with affective expression’, ‘with developmental
expression’ and not otherwise specified, he simply replaces
outdated terms but retains the invalid and unreliable concepts –
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder re-emerge with different
names.
The evidence for a psychosis spectrum, as he describes, now
seems irrefutable. At one end, manic symptoms ‘represent the
greatest diagnostic value’ and this end of the continuum seems
relatively recognisable and clinically relevant. Moving towards
the other end takes us into Bleuler’s schizophrenias and the more
recently emerged area of drug-related psychosis. We have argued
the case that rather than simply continuing to try to homogenise
the schizophrenias, we should listen to what patients tell us led to
their first episodes. Dudley et al2 have recently used Q-sort
methodology to elicit this and found similarities to concepts
developed empirically from clinical practice.3 We have used these
concepts of drug-related, traumatic, stress-sensitivity (early-onset)
and anxiety (late-onset) psychoses successfully with patients4 and
also found them to be destigmatising.5 They are derived from
work which Van Os himself has been pre-eminent in developing
and we suggest to him that he has the courage of his convictions
and use aetiological concepts rather than nebulous descriptive
ones.
1 van Os J. A salience dysregulation syndrome. Br J Psychiatry 2009; 194:
101–3.
2 Dudley R, Siitarinen J, James I, Dodgson G. What do people with psychosis
think caused their psychosis? A Q methodology study. Behav Cogn
Psychother 2009; 371: 11–24.
3 Kingdon DG, Turkington D. Cognitive Therapy of Schizophrenia. Guilford,
2005.
4 Kingdon D, Gibson A, Kinoshita Y, Turkington D, Rathod S, Morrison A.
Acceptable terminology and subgroups in schizophrenia: an exploratory
study. Soc Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol 2008; 43: 239–43.
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Author’s reply: In an attempt to come up with new termin-
ology, I sought to combine scientific evidence for valid contrasts
with scientific evidence for a mechanism (aberrant assignment
of salience) that refers to a psychological process that the general
public can recognise and relate to, although a considerable
amount of explanation may be necessary (see my reply to Bill
George1). Kingdon et al propose a different approach: they select
possible risk factors and mechanisms associated with schizo-
phrenia and investigate whether aetiological diagnostic constructs
based on these are acceptable to patients. To the degree that their
method included an analysis of acceptability to patients,2 their
proposal is certainly superior to mine. A weakness of the method
may be that there is little evidence that, for example, trauma and
drug use underlie discrete effects that can be separated diagnost-
ically. If anything, research suggests that there may be interacting
causes that have an impact on the same final common pathway.3,4
Although it could certainly be argued that as long as there are
established risk factors (although doubts exist5,6) and the
terminology is acceptable to patients, this should not prevent their
use as aetiological diagnostic constructs: a major problem would
remain – acceptability to mental health professionals. How likely
is it that these constructs would be accepted by the DSM and
ICD committees currently revising diagnostic criteria? In my view,
if we really want to abandon the stigmatising term of ‘mind-split
disease’, it is important to come up with an alternative that is not
only acceptable to patients, but also to mental health profes-
sionals. The reason for this is that DSM and ICD terminology is
by far the most influential in how the general public attempts to
understand ‘madness’. Therefore, unless DSM and ICD termin-
ology is changed, the part of the stigma that is induced by con-
fusing and mystifying terminology will not change. Also, the
continued use of the term ‘psychosis’ proposed by Kingdon et al
may perpetuate the mystification of the experiences of patients,
as the public cannot understand this term to make a connection
to their own psychological experiences.
The most important issue, however, is how many patients,
professionals and other stakeholders want the name to change.
It certainly seems that many are of the opinion that a confusing
and mystifying 19th-century term should not be used to diagnose
patients in the 21st century. Maybe the time has come for the
DSM and ICD committees to make a decision on this topic
and, in the case a name change is favoured, to develop a process
through which a change that is acceptable to as many stakeholders
as possible is achieved. The methodology of consulting patients
developed by Kingdon et al should figure prominently in this
endeavour.
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Abortion and mental health disorders
The paper by Fergusson et al,1 accompanied by comments, is a
valuable addition to knowledge on this topic, but I should like
to mention two issues which limit the usefulness of what is
presented.
First, neither Fergusson nor the commentators give sufficient
emphasis to the fact that that the communities of the
Christchurch area of New Zealand are relatively prosperous and
well organised compared with those in many parts of the rest of
the world. The study findings cannot be extrapolated to
communities where poverty, various degrees of malnutrition,
and scarce medical and social services are common. In such
communities, the modest level of what Fergusson et al call ‘mental
disorders’ is likely to be present in many persons whether
pregnant or not, and the significance of an unwanted pregnancy
is also likely to be quite different from what it might be in more
prosperous settings. How these issues interact can only be
examined by direct studies in different communities.
Second, one of the commentators (Professor Patricia Casey)
presents herself as ‘not a member of any campaigning
organisation’, and also lists a number of her other activities to
do with abortion and related issues. But there is no mention
(probably due to the never-ending search for brevity that plagues
us all) of the fact that she is a sincere member of the Roman
Catholic Church, and that she always takes what can be called
the ‘pro-life’ side in debates about abortion and related issues.
Professor Casey is, of course, completely entitled to her opinions,
and I have no doubt that she is proud of her activities in this
difficult field and would never wish to hide them. But in these
debates we all start from a position determined in part by personal
background, and readers will not fully understand comments
unless such things are known.
1 Fergusson DM, Horwood LJ, Boden JM. Abortion and mental health
disorders: evidence from a 30-year longitudinal study. Br J Psychiatry
2008; 193: 444–51.
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Author’s reply: Professor Cooper suggests that the findings we
report may not describe the linkages between abortion and mental
health in communities that are more impoverished than the
relatively advantaged New Zealand community that we studied.
We agree that it would be rash to generalise our findings to these
contexts. We are of the view that it is important that research into
this topic is conducted in communities where material and
economic conditions may make unwanted pregnancy a far more
serious and stressful life event than is the case for relatively
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privileged developed societies. As we point out in our paper, the
important implications of our research relate to the interpretation
of the abortion laws in legislations such as those in the UK and
New Zealand where the mental health risks of unwanted
pregnancy are the principal grounds on which abortion is
authorised. Our findings suggest that in the New Zealand context,
at least, the mental health risks of abortion may outweigh the
mental health risks of unwanted pregnancies that come to term
but that, in any event, the mental health risks associated with
either of these outcomes appear be relatively small.
David Fergusson, Christchurch Health and Development Study, Department of
Psychological Medicine, Christchurch School of Medicine and Health Sciences,
Christchurch, New Zealand. Email: dm.fergusson@otago.ac.nz
doi: 10.1192/bjp.194.6.570b
Editor’s note: When I commissioned the commentaries on
Dr Fergusson’s paper I was aware that the subject of abortion
tended to polarise opinions. For this reason I commissioned two
reviews, one from each side of the debate, but I had confidence
from my choice of authors that they would focus primarily on
Dr Fergusson’s paper, not the wider issues. I chose Professor Casey
as someone who was a pro-life supporter and Dr Oates as a
representative of the pro-choice group (with agreement for Drs
Jones and Cantwell to be added later), even though I consider
these terms somewhat limited and two-dimensional in the context
of reviewing a scholarly paper, and believe that specific
declarations of interest in this context were unnecessary. I hoped
that neither commentary was viewed as tendentious by our
readers and personally regard both of them as adding substance
to the conclusion of Fergusson et al that ‘the results do not
support strong pro-life positions that claim that abortion has large
and devastating effects on the mental health of women. Neither do
the results support strong pro-choice positions that imply that
abortion is without any mental health effects’ (p. 450).1
1 Fergusson DM, Horwood LJ, Boden JM. Abortion and mental health
disorders: evidence from a 30-year longitudinal study. Br J Psychiatry
2008; 193: 444–51.






Group psychoeducation for stabilised bipolar disorders: 5-year
outcome of a randomised clinical trial. BJP, 194, 260–265. Table
2, p. 264: the values for Depression should read: Control group
398.55 (364.16); Psychoeducation group 93.28 (165.46). This
was a typographical error only and does not affect the statistical
analysis presented.
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